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Abstract 
Since Enron and the ruin of thousands of its employees, employee ownership is harshly 
criticized. Investing savings in employer’s stock would be equivalent to bet on only one 
asset. Moreover, employee ownership’s debated efficiency would not justify employers to 
grant company stock to their employees. Still, employee ownership is put in place by 
thousands of companies and withhold by millions of employees throughout the world. This 
paper considers a moral hazard setting where a risk neutral entrepreneur grants company 
stock to its risk averse employee as an incentive. We show that there is an optimal transfer of 
employee ownership that satisfies employee’s risk preference and has an incentive effect. We 
thus bring about rational argument in favor of employee ownership. 
 
 
 
Key words: Employee ownership, moral hazard, company stock, perfect Nash equilibrium in 
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1. Introduction 
When employees invest both their human capital and a substantial proportion of their wealth 
in their company, they expose themselves to ill-considered risk. Indeed, such a strategy 
contradicts the basic advises of portfolio theory regarding diversification’s benefits. The risk 
increases if employee ownership serves as retirement assets. Several sadly famous American 
firms such as Enron and WorldCom went bankrupt in the early 2000s blowing away the 
savings of thousands of workers who invested massively in their company stock. These events 
put employee ownership into light and made policy makers aware of the risks associated with 
undiversified 401(k) plans
1
. The most striking was that contributions to the 401(k) plans were 
discretionary. Employees decided themselves to put a substantial proportion of their 
retirement savings in their company stock with no regard to the basic diversification rules. 
Studies focusing on employee ownership and diversification tried to understand or to justify 
employees’ behavior regarding investment in company stock. These contributions rely on the 
same assertion, that is: employee owners’ behavior is senseless because it contradicts the 
basic advises of modern portfolio theory. Consequently, employee ownership should be very 
limited. However, employee ownership is put in place by companies worldwide and millions 
of workers hold their company stock. 
The literature on employee ownership and diversification has two shortcomings. The first is 
that it is mainly focused on a very specific form of employee ownership, namely employee 
ownership in American 401(k). But, although employee ownership within American 401(k) 
has been the target of the critics these latter years, it is not the only way of holding employee 
ownership in the United States. In fact, the diversification problem is more likely to affect 
American workers in large firms whose 401(k) is massively invested in company stock. Other 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are more widespread in smaller companies where 
employees often have a diversified retirement plan. In most western countries, retirement 
system differs significantly from the American one. The United States rely less on their Social 
Security system to provide for retirement income than European countries. Moreover, some 
countries restrict or prohibit employee ownership within retirement plans. In both cases, 
employee ownership has little to do with retirement and the diversification problem concerns 
a shorter period of time. A second drawback of the literature on employee ownership and 
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 401(k) is the most popular US retirement savings scheme. The term 401(k) refers to the US Internal Revenue 
Code. A 401(k) plan is a defined contribution plan that permits employees to have a portion of their salary 
deducted from their paycheck and contributed to an account. Federal (and sometimes State) taxes on the 
employee contributions and investment earnings are deferred until the participant receives a distribution from the 
plan (typically at retirement). Employers may also make contributions to a participant's account. 
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diversification is to disregard employee ownership’s incentive effects although an important 
literature in management highlighted how employee ownership positively affects workers’ 
attitudes. This is not surprising since the literature on employee ownership and diversification 
is mainly concerned with retirement plans. In fact, employee ownership’s incentive 
effectiveness is certainly lowered when the company stock are cashed out by the workers 
many years after they were granted by the employer. Thus, addressing the incentive issue 
becomes more consistent when employee ownership is considered as a shorter term 
investment. The major contribution of the paper is based on the introduction of the argument 
of diversification in the usual principal-agent model. 
Our model investigates both employee ownership incentive effects and diversification 
problem. We thus put the emphasis on the company’s contribution policy. In order to study 
the interaction of incentive mechanisms with the diversification problem, we consider 
employee ownership as a reward system within a moral hazard setting. This interaction has 
never been implemented so far. The main result of our analysis is to show that there is an 
optimal transfer of company stock that satisfies employee’s risk preference and has an 
incentive effect. This result brings about rational argument in favor of employee ownership. 
The paper is organized as follows. After a discussion of our contribution relative to the 
existing literature on employee ownership and diversification in section 2, we present the 
model set-up in section 3. Section 4 proves the existence of a general solution which gives the 
optimal transfer of employee ownership as a perfect Nash equilibrium in sub-game. Under 
standard hypotheses on probability distribution and utility, we develop some simulations 
which illustrate the properties of the solution in section 5. Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks. All proofs are presented in the appendix. 
 
 
2. Literature 
Investing in only one security implies throwing away the benefit of diversification. From a 
rational perspective, this lack of diversification should be compensated. A first rational 
motivation of this apparently irrational behavior might be that employees receive 
compensation of this risk from their employer. Such compensation can take the form of a 
discount on stock price or a matching contribution in company stock conditional on 
employees’ investment decision. The idea of compensating the risk of holding company stock 
with employers’ contribution was first evoked by one of the founders of the American 
Economic Association in 1886. John Bates Clark considered company’s contribution as a way 
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to stimulate employee ownership without putting personal worker saving at risk. As a matter 
of fact, matching contribution in company stock is a strong motivation for employees. 
Benartzi (2001), Holden and VanDerhei (2001) and Brown et al. (2006) find that employees’ 
investment in company stock is higher in firms where the employer directs matching 
contribution into company stock. According to these authors’ computations, the percent of 
employees’ own contribution allocated to company stock is nearly ten percent points higher 
on average
2
. Interestingly, Brown et al. (2006) find a relationship between company’s 
matching policy and their stock risk. 
A second rational explanation is the advantageous tax treatment associated to employee stock 
ownership. Numerous western countries put in place tax benefit in order to stimulate 
employee ownership. In the United States, most of rules about these tax benefits are found in 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC). But, surprisingly, Benartzi et al. (2007) show that employees are not fully aware of 
these tax advantages and conclude they cannot be the main motivation to invest in their 
company stock. 
A third rationale for employee owners’ holdings is the private information hypothesis. As 
insiders, employees would have better knowledge of their firm and would be able to earn 
abnormal returns. Yet, Benartzi (2001) and Huberman and Sengmuller (2004) report no 
significant correlation between investment choices and subsequent returns and rejected the 
information based explanation. Cohen (2008) does not find evidence that employees have 
superior information about future company stock returns either. 
According to Harbaugh (2005)
3
, employee stock ownership increases the efficiency of wage 
bargaining. Without employee ownership plans, bargaining can lead to over or under 
employment depending on the business cycle. So employee ownership would be a mean to 
reduce the drawback of fixed wages. 
If the above mentioned explanations apply, the diversification cost may be compensated. But 
how much it will take to compensate this cost? Several contributions have estimated it, on a 
risk-adjusted basis, holding a single stock is worth less than holding a market indexed 
portfolio. According to Poterba (2003), Meulbroek (2005) and Brennan and Torous (1999), 
investors holding a single-stock portfolio sacrifice half the equivalent amount invested in a 
diversified portfolio. Option pricing techniques allow Ramaswamy (2003) to find that the cost 
of insuring the extra risk of company stock is prohibitively expensive. In spite of the high cost 
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 11 percent for Benartzi (2001; p. 1753) and 8 percent for Brown et al. (2006; p. 1324). 
3
 This reference was suggested by an anonymous referee.  
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of this strategy, employees hold their company stock and seem to miss the true risk of lack of 
diversification. This apparently irrational behavior has motivated scholars to investigate 
psychological factors. 
Huberman (2001) argues that employees’ financial well-being is closely tied to their company 
stock because this investment is very familiar to them. Because of ―familiarity’s bias‖, 
employees consider their company stock as a safe investment. Survey data from Benartzi et 
al. (2007) shows that 39 percent of employees think their company stock is as risky as a 
diversified stock fund, whereas 25 percent believe it is safer. Cohen (2008) argues that loyalty 
to one’s employer is another psychological factor leading employees to hold their company 
stock. Using divisional employee status as a loyalty proxy, Cohen finds support of the 
―loyalty hypothesis‖. 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find that employees’ saving behavior is altered if employee 
ownership is offered as a choice within their retirement plan. They conclude: ―It appears that 
the mental accounting of these investments involves putting the company stock into its own 
category separate from other equities‖ (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; p. 595).  
Benartzi (2001) extends the investigation further by observing workers’ behavior in large 
corporate defined contribution retirement plans. He found that employees interpret 
abnormally high past performance as representative of future performance, even if stock 
returns are largely unpredictable. Benartzi (2001) shows that employees whose employer 
stock experienced the best returns during the last ten years invested nearly 40% of their 401 
(k) plans in company stock. Conversely, for the same period of time, employees whose firms 
experienced the worst results invested only 10% of their plan in company stock. This 
investment behavior is called ―excessive extrapolation‖. He concluded that employee 
ownership is a ―dubious strategy‖ and that ―individuals do not fully understand the risk of 
company stock‖ (Benartzi, 2001; p. 1760). 
While insightful, these latter studies disregarded the potential incentive power of employee 
ownership. They did not investigate the trade-off between risk and incentive that employee 
ownership incurs. In order to explain employees’ behavior, these recent studies either adopted 
a rational viewpoint or they focused on psychological factors without considering employee 
ownership as a reward system. However, several studies emphasized that employee ownership 
affects performance at the individual and corporate level. Kruse (2002) reviewed most of 
them and concluded that ―studies are split between favorable and neutral findings on the 
relationship between employee ownership and firm performance‖. 
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 Klein (1987) shows that employee ownership is especially effective if it is financially 
rewarding. According to her, this finding ―is consistent with the economic literature on 
principal and agent relations which suggests that financial incentives such as merit pay, 
gainsharing, and — by extension — employee ownership, may make agents utility interests 
compatible with those of the principal‖ (Klein, 1987; p. 321). At the corporate level, Blasi et 
al. (1996) show that companies with Employee Stock Ownership Plans report 6 percent 
higher productivity holding other factors constant.  
More recently, Blasi et al. (2008) investigated if employee ownership is consistent with 
proper diversification. They used traditional portfolio analysis techniques to conclude that 
holding company stock does not significantly annihilate diversification benefits. Our model 
reinforces this result bridging portfolio analysis technique with employee ownership’s 
incentive effect. The analysis is based on a sequential game in which the manager motivates 
the employee to expand effort by granting company stock. So far, the literature has focused 
either on the portfolio diversification problem or on the link between employee ownership and 
performance separating the two questions. On one hand, diversification cost of investing in 
company stock was estimated assuming perfect information whereas empirical studies about 
employees’ decision relied on behavioral approach. To the best of our knowledge, this first 
body of literature never regarded imperfect information problems as a major determinant of 
employee ownership. On another hand, empirical studies investigating the incentive effects of 
employee ownership disregarded the risk on employees’ wealth that comes with it. Our paper 
is an attempt to fill in this theoretical gap. We have found an analytical solution that shows 
that, under some assumptions, it is possible to find an optimal level of company stock 
distribution that ensures an optimal level of profit for the company. 
 
 
3. Model description 
The one-period model with two steps consists of a risk neutral entrepreneur and a risk averse 
employee who is representative of all company employees. We thus consider all employees to 
have homogeneous preferences.  
At the first stage, the entrepreneur designs the compensation system aimed at motivating the 
employee to expand his desired level of effort. The compensation system we investigate only 
consists in employee ownership. We thus consider a setup where the entrepreneur has to 
decide whether or not to offer company stock to his employee and the amount of it. The 
entrepreneur’s wealth Wd is totally invested in company stock. When employee ownership is 
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offered to employee, it takes the form of a contribution in company stock that diminishes 
entrepreneur’s wealth. To simplify the exposition, suppose c to be a proportion of Ws, the 
initial employee’s wealth. cWs is the money value of company stock granted to employee. 
Indeed, the money value of the contribution granted to the employee is very often 
commensurate with the amount invested by the employee. For instance, it takes the form of a 
discount or a matching contribution. Degeorge et al. (2004) confirmed empirically that 
wealthier employees are more willing to take a firm exposure.  
 At the second stage, the employee observes the compensation system and chooses e, the level 
of effort that affects return on company stock re. Let )(
H
e erF  and )(
L
e erF  
be the 
cumulative distribution functions of company stock return conditional on high level of effort 
e
H
 and low level of effort e
L
, we assume )(
H
e erF  < )(
L
e erF . Therefore, the agent effort is 
productive in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The effort is personally costly to 
the employee that endures )(e  the disutility that is increasing with effort. Employee’s initial 
wealth Ws is totally invested in the market portfolio. If employee ownership is granted, 
employee’s wealth increases by an amount cWs of company stock. We explicit the means of 
the conditional distributions of re with respect to e
H
 and e
L
 respectively as He  and 
L
e . The 
return of company stock is then )1( jeer   for a level of effort j={H,L} with )( erf  the 
centered density function. Similarly, m  is the mean of the distribution of mr , the return of the 
market portfolio is then (1+ mr + m ), with a centered density function )( mrf .  
The entrepreneur’s and employee’s utilities at the end of the game depend on the strategies 
they adopt. If, at some period of the game, one of the players decides to not participate, their 
expected utility at the end of the game is null. The agents’ expected utilities at the end of the 
game depend on whether c is granted or not and on the agent’s level of effort eH or eL. Let’s 
denote jiV , the entrepreneur expected utility if a contribution i={0,c} is granted and a level of 
effort j={H,L} is implemented. We suppose the entrepreneur is risk neutral. Therefore, he 
maximizes the expected value of his wealth V
0,j
 or V
c,j
 depending on whether c is granted or 
not: 
 



 ]1[)()1(,0 jedee
j
eed
j WdrrfrWV   (1) 
 



 ]1)[()()1)((, jesdee
j
eesd
jc cWWdrrfrcWWV   (2) 
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The employee’s expected utility is U0,j or Uc,j and also depends on c, with u(.) the risk averse 
utility function: 
 



 )()()]1([,0 jmmmms
j edrrfrWuU   (3) 
 
 




 )(),()]1()1([, jmeme
j
eesmms
jc edrdrrrfrcWrWuU   (4) 
Figure 1 presents the structure of the game and the gain matrix. 
 
 
Assumption A1: The employee’s expected utility is required to be positive even when 
company stock is not granted. 
 
0)()()]1([,0 


 Lmmmms
L edrrfrWuU   (A1) 
The first assumption ensures the existence of the firm. 
 
 
Assumption A2: The employee’s expected utility is higher with employee ownership for a 
given level of effort. 
 
)()(]1([)(),()]1()1([ jmmmms
j
meme
j
eesmms edrrfrWuedrdrrrfrcWrWu   






  (A2) 
Without any counterpart, for a given level of effort, granting company stock to the employee 
increases his expected utility. 
 
 
Assumption A3: The employee is cautious. His relative risk aversion is smaller than one. 
 
1
)('
)(''
: 
xu
xu
xx 
 
(A3) 
The usual justification of this assumption is that, in this case, the increase of the risk free rate 
fosters savings (Gollier, 2008). 
 
 
Assumption 4: The market portfolio return’s distributions are symmetric.  (A4) 
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This assumption avoids hedging effects between the market portfolio and company stock due 
to left and right asymetry (antimonotonic assets) (Chateauneuf et al., 2001). 
 
 
4. Derivation of an optimal relation contract 
Before presenting the main result, we need to develop some machinery and intuition. Lemmas 
1, 2, 3 and 4 and 5 describe respectively the entrepreneur’s and employee’s optimal strategies. 
 
 
LEMMA 1: When the entrepreneur does not grant company stock (c=0), the employee  exerts 
low level of effort. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
 
 
LEMMA 2: Entrepreneur’s exit does not lead to a perfect Nash equilibrium in sub-game. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
 
 
Granting a positive amount of company stock ( 0c ) and exerting a high level of effort 
),( ,, HcHc UV  is a perfect Nash equilibrium in sub-game when several conditions are satisfied. 
The manager plays 0c  if LHc VV ,0,   and 0, VV Hc  . 
The employee chooses to work harder if LcHc UU ,,   and 0, UU Hc  . 
 
 
LEMMA 3: The condition LHc VV ,0,   implies that the condition 0, VV Hc   is satisfied. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
 
 
LEMMA 4: The condition LcHc UU ,,   implies that the condition 0, UU Hc   is satisfied. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
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According to lemmas 3 and 4, a perfect Nash equilibrium in sub-game is fulfilled if 
LHc VV ,0,   and LcHc UU ,,  . The first condition ( LHc VV ,0,  ) that leads the manager to 
grant employee ownership can be written as follows. 
 
H
e
L
e
H
e
s
d
W
W
cc





1
 (5) 
Where c  is the threshold above which granting company is too costly to the entrepreneur. 
The second condition ( LcHc UU ,,  ) that ensures a high level of effort exerted by the 
employee can be expressed as    LH eec  )(
 
 where: 
 
 
 










)()(),()]1()1([
),()]1()1([)(
LH
meme
L
eesmms
meme
H
eesmms
eedrdrrrfrcWrWu
drdrrrfrcWrWuc


 (6) 
ω(0)=0, if the difference    LH ee    is sufficiently small and ω(c) is an increasing 
function, an optimal level of company stock c* exists, c*]0, c ]. 
 
 
LEMMA 5: ω(c) is an increasing function from 0. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
Given lemmas 1 to 5, the following proposition establishes the existence of an optimal 
transfer of company stock that satisfies employee’s risk preference and has an incentive 
effect. 
 
 
PROPOSITION: Under assumptions A1 to A4, given a small disutility of effort difference 
   LH ee   4, an optimal transfer of company stock c*]0,c ] exists. It satisfies the 
conditions of a perfect Nash equilibrium in sub-game (Selten, 1965) given: 
 
 










)()(),()]1(*)1([
),()]1(*)1([*)(
LH
meme
L
eesmms
meme
H
eesmms
eedrdrrrfrWcrWu
drdrrrfrWcrWuc


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 LHc VV ,0,   can be written as cc   (see equation 5). )()(*)( LH eec    and 
  ceec LH   )()(* 1  , with ω monotonous and increasing. Consequently, )()()( cee LH    that 
explains what is called a sufficiently small difference. 
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with 
H
e
L
e
H
e
s
d
W
W
c





1
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the proposition. The entrepreneur selects the minimum level of c that 
insures a high level of effort. Indeed, the higher the amount of company stock, the lower the 
entrepreneur’s wealth. The additional disutility bore by the employee due to a higher effort is 
exactly compensated by a supplementary utility of wealth. Figure 2 shows that the difference 
between the two levels of disutility of effort cannot be compensated above c . Beyond c , 
employee ownership becomes too costly to the entrepreneur.  
 
 
5. Application 
To illustrate how relational contract can be used, this section provides numerical results of the 
model. The calibration needs the specification of the distributions of company stock and 
market portfolio returns and the utility function of the employee. We take the usual 
assumption of normality for the distribution and negative exponential for the utility function. 
Given the conditions of the perfect Nash equilibrium in sub-game expounded in section 4 and 
the form of the negative exponential utility function, the analytical solution of c* is given by
5
: 
 0,
)()(
expexp)()(*)( 

 a
a
ee
eec
LH
HLLH   (7) 
with:
        )1(*12
2
1 222222
emsyxemmexemmyeme cWmmmm  

  
The joint distribution of re and rm is normal with a covariance matrix 








2
2
mem
eme


. δ takes 
the values of H  and L  when Hee    and 
L
ee    respectively and where mx are my given 
by expressions (21) and (22) computed in the appendix. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
 
Traditional comparative statics analysis makes it possible to emphasize several properties of 
the solution. Some results are intuitive and do not raise a debate. Conversely, other major 
results clarify the specificities of employee ownership contracts.  
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 A graphical illustration of the solution is given by figure 2. 
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Major results: 
1) Figure 3(a) displays how the correlation coefficient between the company stock and 
the market returns interacts with c*. This first result is the most interesting. c* 
decreases as the correlation of company stock with the market increases. It is in line 
with Blasi et al. (2008) argument according to which ―a small but meaningful 
employee stock ownership level will not significantly deteriorate the diversification of 
employee portfolios‖ (p. 17). Here, as far as the return on company stock is highly 
correlated with the market, incentive effect associated with employee ownership is 
obtained for a lower level of c*. 
 
2) Figure 3(b) shows the positive relationship between the company stock mean return 
obtained with a low level of effort and c*. In figure 2, increasing Le  moves ω(c) to 
the bottom and increases c*. This second result is appealing because it highlights the 
relative situation of firms according to their level of productivity. Ceteris paribus, the 
marginal efficiency of one dollar distributed to the employee is more important for a 
low level of productivity ( Le ) than for a higher level. The compensation plan will be 
more costly for a highly productive firm than for a lower one. 
 
Minor results 
3) The remaining figures show evidence of more intuitive results. Figure 3(c) exhibits a 
positive link between the market portfolio mean return and c*. As the market return is 
higher, the opportunity cost of investing in company stock whose return remains 
constant is higher. It becomes more costly to the employee to hold a smaller part of his 
wealth in the market portfolio. To induce a high level of effort, the manager must 
compensate this cost by increasing c*. Figure 3(c) shows to what extent this cost must 
be compensated by a higher c*. 
4) Figure 3(d) shows a positive relationship between the market portfolio volatility and 
c*. This result is due to the construction of the correlation coefficient. For a given 
level of this correlation coefficient, increasing the market portfolio volatility always 
results in increasing the company stock standard deviation. The additional risk of 
holding company stock has to be compensated by a higher c* up to the threshold c .  
5) Figure 3(e) investigates the link between entrepreneur’s wealth and c*. As 
entrepreneur’s wealth increases, c  expands to a certain level where it becomes high 
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enough to compensate employee’s effort. Behind this level, the conditions of the 
perfect Nash equilibrum in sub-game are not satisfied. The dashed increasing part of 
the figure 3(e) illustrates this situation which corresponds to values of c between 0 and 
c* in figure 2. Once c* is reached, increasing the amount of company stock becomes 
useless since the employee always selects a high level of effort. 
6) Figure 3(f) presents the negative relationship between employee’s wealth and c*. The 
employee’s cost of exerting a high level of effort remains constant, so is the money 
value of company stock he is granted c*Ws. c* must decrease to keep this amount 
constant when employee’s wealth increases. Then the relation between Ws and c* is 
hyperbolic. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
An important idea in the literature is that employee ownership is too costly to firms and 
employees to be implemented. From the management’s point of view, employee ownership 
would be ineffective. Regarding employees’ point, holding company stock would not be an 
optimal investment strategy. Our analysis identifies circumstances under which employee 
ownership is an optimal strategy, even though it is costly to entrepreneur and employee.  
The main result is that there is an optimal transfer of employee ownership that satisfies 
employee’s risk preference and has an incentive effect. So far, only behavioral arguments 
have explained the existence of employee ownership as an investment strategy. We thus bring 
about rational arguments in favor of employee ownership and show how several variables 
included in the model interact with the optimal transfer of company stock. In this paper, we 
are able to give an analytical expression of the optimal level of company stock as a function 
of several variables. It appears that if the correlation between the market return and the 
company return is high, then the employee’ risk connected to under diversification is reduced 
and so, the optimal level of share to be distributed is not as high as when there is no 
correlation between market return and firm return. In addition, it is also possible to conclude 
on a decreasing return of the incentive effect. 
Future work could examine the impact of different aspects of the employee ownership 
contract. For instance, firms often offer employee ownership within retirement plan. 
Conditions under which company stock can be included in a long run investment strategy 
could be emphasized.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Extensive form of the game and the payoff matrix 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Determination of the c* 
 
Notes. Thick lines represent (a) entrepreneur’s wealth Vc,H with the optimal contract; (b) the maximum threshold 
of company stock granted c ; (c) the difference of employee’s utility wealth due to a high level of effort ω(c).   
Dash line represents the disutility of effort bore by the employee. 
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Figure 3: Relationships between c* and the variables of the model 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1. 
According to A1, the employee has always an incentive to participate to the contract. Indeed, 
his utility is always positive ( 0,0 LU ) if he participates whereas it equals zero ( 00 U ) 
when he does not participate. A1 insures employee’s participation even without employee 
ownership. Furthermore, exerting a high level of effort is more costly to the employee 
(    LH ee   ). Consequently, if c=0, employee’s optimal action is to exert low level of 
effort ( L,0H,0 UU  ). 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. 
Manager’s participation gives him a higher wealth than exit ( 0,0 VV L  ) even if the employee 
selects low level of effort. More over, lemma 1 insures that V
0,L
 is always reachable. 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. 
Manager’s wealth is smaller if he does not participate whatever the level of effort selected by 
the employee. 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. 
According to A2 and A1, the employee’s utility is (i) higher if he is granted company stock 
than if he is not ( LLc UU ,0,  ) and (ii) always positive in case of participation to the contract 
( 0,0 UU L  ). Consequently, the employee’s utility is higher when he chooses the low level of 
effort and he is granted company stock than when he does not participate to the contract 
( 0, UU Lc  ). 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5. 
For c=0, ω(0)=0. Furthermore, as shown below, 0
)(



c
c
. 
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 (8) 
According to A3, α≤1. 
 
0))'('(,0)('')('1
)('
)(''
 xxuxxxuxu
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Replacing X and Y  in equation (7) gives: 
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We name I and J the two parts of the following expression: 
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(11) 
With c≥0,
 
 if I and J are positive, then 
c
c

 )(
 is also positive.  
Since )(' xxu  is monotonously increasing and X>Y, I≥0.  
 
We name K and L the two parts of J: 
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With 0sW , 0)1(  m  , if K and L are positive then J is also positive. 
With  X>Y and u’’<0, we have u’(Y)>u’(X). Consequently, K>0. 
We write L:  
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With 0''' u  and L
e
H
e   , 0
),(



m
em
r
rrG
. Since G(rm,re) is increasing in rm and the 
distributions of rm are symmetric (A4),  we have: 0),(),( 




 emememm drdrrrfrrGrL  
Since K>0 and L≥0, we have J>0. 
 
I ≥0 and J>0 imply ω’(c)>0. 
 
APPLICATION WITH A NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL UTILITY FUNCTION 
To give an analytical value of c*: (i) We use a change of variable so we can write the 
employee utility function multiplied by the normal distribution density function like another 
density function with different means multiplied by a constant term D. Since the normal 
density integrals equal one, the constant term D appears after integration. (ii) We then 
normalize the utility function and (iii) compute c*. 
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(i) Normal distribution density function 
For a given normal distribution N (m, Σ) defined in ),( nnIR   with X the random vector, m is 
the means vector and Σ the covariance matrix. If the covariance matrix is regular ( 0 ), the 
normal distribution density function is:  
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Our model includes two random variables, the market portfolio and the company stock 
returns. Consequently, we write (14) with n=2. We write: 
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determinant and 
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We therefore assume that the market portfolio and the company stock returns are normally 
distributed and centered in ),( nnIR  , 0 me mm  and that the regular covariance matrix 
is 


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



2
2
mem
eme


 with 222 emme   . After replacing in (15), the joint utility function 
density f(re,rm) becomes: 
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When employee ownership is offered, the employee’s utility of wealth is given by (4) 
conditional on the level of effort exerted. With an exponential utility function, the employee’ 
utility becomes: 
       ),(1*1exp),( meeesmmsme rrfrWcrWrrg    (17) 
where e  takes the values 
H
e  and 
L
e . 
Combining (16) with (17) gives:  
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where e  takes the values 
H
e  and 
L
e . 
We must now compute the means mx and my such as emxymyex   ,,  (that is 
 ) to identify ),( yx  and ),( me rrg  multiplied by a constant term D so that: 
 ),(),( me rrgyxD   (19) 
The identification of (15) multiplied by D and (18) gives the following expressions: 
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This system has a unique solution if:  
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The determinant is not null if me   . 
The solutions of the system (20) are: 
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Identifying (15) multiplied by D to (18) finally gives: 
  expD  (23) 
with: 
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where δ takes the values of H  and L  when Hee    and 
L
ee    respectively and where 
mx are my given by expressions (21) and (22). 
 
(ii) Normalization of the utility function 
The Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function was normalized by 0)0( u  for a given level 
of wealth Ws. We use an affine transformation. 
0,)(   WeWv  
0,)()(  abWavWu  
abubaeWu W   0)0(,)(   
Consequently, the utility function becomes: 
 0,0],1[)(   aeaWu W   (24) 
Considering equations (19) and (24), we can rewrite the condition ω(c*):  
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where a is a positive constant term. 
Since the normal density integrals equal to one, ω(c*) becomes: 
  HL DDac )( *  (25) 
where D
H
 and D
L
 are the values of D given by (22) with Hee    and 
L
ee    respectively. 
 
(iii)Computation of  c* 
c* is given by: 
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where H  and L  are given by (23) with Hee    and 
L
ee    respectively and mx et my are 
given respectively by (21) et (22). 
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